Lebanon on the Brink (II of II)

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Al-Akhbar Management

The current crisis in Lebanon – like all crises in Lebanese contemporary history – has domestic and foreign dimensions. Typically, the domestic dimensions have foreign connections, and vice versa.

It would be unfair to maintain that the incompetent leadership of Saad Hariri has been largely responsible for this crisis because the man has been merely implementing policies that originate in Washington and Riyadh. His father, like him, was a mere tool of foreign powers (primarily to Saudi Arabia, Syria, France, and the US, but his loyalty to the House of Saud superseded his other loyalties).

Rafik Hariri was able to negotiate with his patrons in order to adjust to the domestic settings in Lebanon. Saad Hariri knows little about a country that he was assigned to lead by an order from the House of Saud. But the policies of Saad were delivered to him from Riyadh and Washington.

The plan of sectarian agitation by Sunnis against the Shia was the product of a US-Saudi plan to isolate Iran and Hezbollah, and to divert the attention (and hostility) of Arabs away from Israel toward Iran.

The plan intensified in Lebanon after 2006 when Israel failed to defeat and disarm Hezbollah. Israel needed another shot at Hezbollah: the clients of US-Saudi Arabia have been furthering Israeli interests since the assassination of Rafik Hariri (there is always a side in the Lebanese conflict that is aligned openly or covertly with Israel).

The plot was to sponsor a sectarian Sunni campaign against Hezbollah. Within a year or two (and even before 7 May 2008, which has been turned by Hariri propaganda into a day of horrors that Lebanon has not witnessed the likes of which in its history), Jeffrey Feltman and Prince Muqrin in Saudi Arabia (the intelligence chief) thought that they stumbled on a brilliant plan to undermine Hezbollah’s bases of support.

The plan did succeed. Within a couple of years, Sunni public opinion turned against Hezbollah and Hassan Nasrallah. But the plotters did not anticipate the consequences of their actions. The Shia felt threatened and they solidified their support for Hezbollah, and the sectarian agenda of the Hariri camp gave the Shia no space for non-Hezbollah Shia (despite the comical efforts of the US embassy and Saudi intelligence to sponsor “moderate Shia” – people who have no standing within their communities, and often were no more than crooks looking for easy money).

The other consequence of the sectarian plot was that the logical power base for the sectarian agenda were none other than fanatical Sunni (Jihadi) Salafi groups. Groups that were instrumental in sending volunteers to join Al-Qaeda in Iraq were now active in the Hariri camp and receiving US/Saudi money (and arms in some cases).

But the Salafi camp was restless in the Hariri camp. They wanted a more aggressive agenda in Syria and wanted a military involvement. Furthermore, Saad Hariri could not appeal to the poor Sunni base because he only remembers the people of Tripoli, Akkar, and the Bekaa once every four years during election time.

The base turned more into a radical Salafi direction, and Hariri has been out of the country for more than a year now. Local Salafi extremists controlled the Sunni “street” and they were (like the militant Bin Ladenite MP, Khalid al-Daher) receiving Saudi funding directly from Prince Muqrin, without having (like before) to go through the Hariri office which monopolized funding for the pro-Saudi groups in Lebanon. This decentralization allowed for local militant leaders to appeal to the unemployed poor youths in Akkar, Tripoli, and the Bekaa.

But it would not be fair to blame the Hariri camp for sponsoring those militant trends. Hariri rivals in Tripoli (namely Najib Mikati and Muhammad Safadi who both suffer from lack of charisma and from awkward social skills with the masses) sought to gain additional electoral support by funding those militant Salafi trends.

It is possible that the Salafi movement is now not only getting out of control (the control of the Hariri camp, that is), but it may be also abandoning the Saudi cause (while receiving money from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait). It may not be far fetched to imagine a situation where Al-Qaeda recruits head for North Lebanon to receive military training. In fact, this may be happening already with some groups from Syria receiving their training in Akkar.

The recent skirmishes between armed Salafi groups and the Lebanese Army may have been aimed at pushing the Lebanese Army out of the area to obtain political and military freedom. It could only get worse. Nasrallah is effective in restraining the Shia youth, but the public is boiling with anger, and the Amal movement is much more effective in sectarian clashes and thuggery than Hezbollah. Amal may be gaining ground.


As'ad's takhween carnival against the Saudi regime on his blog for many years, and no doubt that they are from the biggest traitors in the Arab world, doesn't hold because many of the groups and people who make takhween of Aal-Su'ood don't have an iota of sincerity in their takhween like Hezbollah or the supporters of Sharif Hussein when they were totally silent on the treachery of their own leaders, groups and allies and Aal-Su'ood were confronted and fought by their own people since the time of King Abdul-Aziz, who was fought by his own people for his treachery with the British to Gulf War I and II when dozens of Saudi shuyookh and thousands of their followers confronted and opposed Aal-Su'ood's treachery with the Americans and the silence of the ulama as-salateen there, and thousands of them are in Saudi dungeons. Compare this to the hypocrites in Amal and Hezbollah who didn't utter a single word of takhween against their allies who rode to power on American tanks. Of course, As'ad doesn't talk about this because it doesn't mesh with the lying propaganda that he peddles.

If I Were a Sunni

In his drive to protect his heroes in Damascus and in
Beirut’s Southern Suburb (Bashar AlAssad and Hassan
Nasrallah,) (in the above two articles titled "Lebanon
On The Brink"), Mr. As’ad Abu Khalil, in his narrative
and prophecy about the upcoming civil strife in
Lebanon, shows utter disregard towards The Arab
Sunni Muslims by asserting that they (and the
Lebanese folks in particular) are the agents for
a new plot to ignite a civil war in Lebanon- A new
strife to alleviate pressure off Israel by entangling
Hezbollah in a new civil quagmire. Here is how
Mr. Abu Khalil’s forecasts the new Sunnis
plot: “The plan intensified in Lebanon after
2006 when Israel failed to defeat and disarm
Hezbollah ….The plan of sectarian agitation by
Sunnis against the Shia was the product of a
US-Saudi plan to isolate Iran and Hezbollah, and
to divert the attention (and hostility) of Arabs away
from Israel toward Iran.”

Similar disregard was evident in Chief Nasrallah’s
speech this past Friday (on May 25) which was
beamed here in BintJbail over giant screens and
mega speakers. I choose to be at a picnic site in
Maroun Al-Rass at that time. I overheard Chief
Hassan Nasrallah bragging about his victories:
“The Zionist did not dare attack or harm local
villagers and farmers in bordering Southern Lebanon
towns,” since the liberation of 2000. I reminded a
companion of this fallacy by pointing my finger
south to the Israeli fence and toward the spot or
site at which 12 Palestinian youths were sniped
down (by Zionist soldiers,) exactly 10 days over
a year ago when Chief Nasrallah bussed the young
boys to Maroun Al-Rass to commemorate the Naka
Day(on 15 May 2011). Indeed, then, Chief Nasrallah
was still able to fool Arabs and Palestinians in particular.
In despicable disrespect to the Palestinian youths’
lives, Chief Nasrallah did not even mention that
massacre altogether-let along any reference to ‘due’
retaliation of such infringement on Lebanon.

Brick by brick I shall examine this plot to see
if it is genuine or phony:

The ‘House of Saud,’ as usually referenced by
Mr. Abu Khalil, twice in our time engineered a
devastating blow to Iraq (an Arab country-then
ruled by a Sunni regime –conforming to Mr. Abu
Khalil’s sectarian references). The Saudi
conspiracy was against a fellow Arab country
(not Iran.) The defeat of Iraq gave Iran (not
Saudi Arabia or the GCC counties) such a
strategic advantage over Arabs in the gulf
and over the Sunnis (always to concur with Mr.
Abu Khalil’s tone) across the Arab land. Iraq
is by far more important to Iran than Lebanon
and Syria together are and controlling it has
been the core of the Persian drive since the
down of their power.

Certainly Mr. Abu Khalil is wiser than those who
defend his positions and none can attest differently
to the US and Saudi roles in defeating Iraq in \
1991 thru 2003.

To surmise how can any fair-minded reader
implicate Saudi Arabia or the US in a conspiracy
against the Shia while at the same time spearhead
an military expedition that installed a Shia Authority
in Iraq that does the bidding of Iran?

Can anyone explain on whose side the Shia of
Iran and those of Iraq were? Should I remind
Mr. Abu Khalil about the incursion of tens of
thousands of Badr militiamen (all Iraqi elements
of Persian ancestry) into the Basra area to cut-off
the Iraqi Army’s rear lines on the eve of the US
assault on Kuwait in late March of 1991?

Can anyone doubt the significance of Iranians
(the Shia in Mr. Abu Khalil terms) collaboration
with the US invasion of Iraq? Should someone
replay the video tapes of all those who rode on
US tanks or those who were parachuted by British
helicopters in Najaf and Basra? Should I mention
the arrival of Martin Indyk’s choice for Iraq: Abd-Almajid
Al-Khouey? How about the victorious arrival of Grand
Ayatollah Mohamad Baker Al-Hakim (his son
Abdul-Aziz Al-Hakim, and his nephew Ammar
Al-hakim) to Najaf from Iran in a 4WD vehicle
supplied by US troops? Should I not mention
the collaboration with the US occupation of
the (Shia Marji’ia) in Najaf and Karbalaa
(Marji’ia: The Highest Learned Establishment for
the Shia Clergymen, similar to Al-Azhar in the
Sunni world, but with far more authority and
reverence by the Shia populous.)

Finding fault with Saad Al-Hariri and his local
allies is the second brick of Mr. Abu Khalil’s
arguments to implicate the Sunnis in that grandiose
conspiracy against the Shia. Mr. Abu Khalil is
relentless in twisting basic facts and specific
events that took place in Lebanon since the
killing of the late Rafik Al-Hariri and 22 bystanders
and guards, (on 14 Feb 2005.). In his
subjective reading of Hezbollah assault on
Beirut, “The Hariri camp deliberately provoked
Hezbollah on 5 May 2008, which made the
May 7 events inevitable,” Mr. Abu Khalil
blatantly try to shift the blame of all losses
of lives and destruction his hero Nasrallah
had wrought on Beirut. Below a few examples:
1-Hiding the fact that Hezbollah operatives are
indicted in plotting and executing a crime to
kill a prominent Sunnis figure (Rafiq Al-Hariri)
as well as about 14 other figures in Lebanon
political life has been a major achievement of Mr. Abu Khalil..

2- Invoking the Arab-Zionist conflict at any
moment Hezbollah needs to conceal an
odd stand or action in order to fool Arabs-
(Lebanese and Palestinian in particular.) Three
irking events Hezbollah and Abu Khalil want
us to forget in particular :( assaulting Beirut
on 7 may 2008, killing Hariri in 2005, Nasrallah
support of Damascus’s butcher.)

3- Beating the drum of fear of the Sunni Salafis
is the latest invention of Mr. Abu Khalil camp
to justify in particular their shameful position
on the right of Syrians for self-determination
and emancipation from the tyranny of their masters.

[Further, in a language strange of any eloquent
writer, As’ad Abu Khalil derides the Shia
elements and figures who oppose the suffocating
control of Hezbollah on the daily lives of people
in Shia towns and villages: “’moderate Shia’ – people
who have no standing within their communities,
and often were no more than crooks looking for
easy money).” This is very much unwarranted
low language when dissecting a political phenomenon.]

Because “Hezbollah can easily prevail in any
internal conflict,” we have not seen carnages
in Lebanon between Sunnis and Shia as we
understand from the quotation. The danger
behind that statement is its wide acceptance
by the average Shia person in Lebanon and
in particular by Hezbollah supporters. A lot
of reading should be done to adequately
answer Mr. Abu Khalil without marring oneself
in the dirty battles of Lebanon past.

When “…sectarian tensions are worse than they
were in 1975,” and “Hezbollah can easily
prevail in any internal conflict.” then what
is left for me (If I were a Sunni) is to stretch
the effectiveness of Nasrallah “in restraining the Shia youth….”

If I were a Sunni, I shall be restless UNTIL I get a better gun!

Douri of the South
BintJbail, Lebanon

And of course the above was written by none other than Karim Hari, the hate-filled sectarian anti-shia who hails from Morocco. He's getting restless in his alter ego as a shia southern lebanese as one can see, from his first and last line ( That's all I read from his garbage usually and this time I read the second last paragraph). One might say that he's the one on the brink.

Proof that he's Karim hari is in the comments section of this article where he forgot to remove his name from the "Your Name" text field but signed with "Douri of the South".

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