Mursi vs. SCAF: Two Weeks Later

By Sarah El Sirgany - Fri, 2012-08-24 19:33- Labyrinth

Cairo - The day President Mohammed Mursi ordered the retirement of the Minister of Defense Hussein Tantawi, Egypt was caught by surprise at the new balance of power. On August 12, it was difficult to immediately see all the possible ramifications.

The Muslim Brotherhood (MB) president’s reshuffling within the powerful Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) were welcomed by many activists. It was a victory by an elected, civilian president over an unelected military body that has given itself the right to write the rules and avoid accountability.

As the shock waned, as analysts and politicians found some answers to their numerous questions and as the celebration of this “victory” subsided, it was time for an obvious realization. The Muslim Brotherhood, who just two weeks ago was complaining about the limited authorities given to Mursi, is now in control, full control. It’s a realization that presented itself in the first week, but grew in strength over the days.

In addition to the SCAF reshuffles, Mursi also canceled a constitutional addendum which the SCAF had issued towards the end of the presidential elections to give itself powers over the elected president, a de facto influence over the drafting of the constitution, and legislative powers. The eleventh hour constitutional decree was an illegitimate usurpation of power. Mursi canceled it, but gave these powers to himself.

Michael Hanna, a fellow at the Century Foundation, described Mursi’s decisions as “a necessary corrective to the intrusion of the military on the prerogatives of civilian governance and an important check on the expanding political ambitions of the Egyptian military.”

However, he also described them as a “unilateral power grab [that] parallels the original sin in Egypt's chaotic and turbulent transition,” a reference to SCAF’s takeover of power in March 2011.

The debate transcends the regular MB versus SCAF deliberations to reflect the deep-rooted distrust of the Muslim Brothers, even among those who supported Mursi during the elections. While some of the concerns are exaggerated, others find their valid justification in Mursi’s other decisions.

The government under the new president’s leadership got more aggressive in its crackdown on journalists critical of Mursi. The fact that it targeted controversial and infamous names or that Mursi later removed the prison sentences on publishing crimes did little to assuage fears about the MB intentions in governance.

The track record of the MB in power – especially when they held 47 percent of the now dissolved People’s Assembly – isn’t promising, especially given that Mursi inherited a regime and a defunct legal system designed for rulers’ abuse. The recent selection of chief editors for state-run papers reflected a continuity of the Mubarak media policy rather than a move towards professionalism and merit-based appointments.

These concerns are further informed by theories that describe the new friendly relationship between the MB and the generals Mursi appointed. The tension between these two poles of powers – Tantawi’s SCAF was presumed to be the most powerful – was replaced with mutual understanding.

Activists frustrated with SCAF “crimes” won’t see the retired generals in court – maybe with pressure, but that’s a remote possibility. Groups that have been working to expose the militarization of the state through systematic appointment of officers in civilian jobs will continue their work as usual. Nothing in Mursi’s changes suggest a structural or institutional change. He even appointed a general as head of the Suez Canal Authority.

“The preserving of military privileges, its economic projects and the scope of its power – even its expansion [in a bid] to pass the change of leadership – will enhance the status quo of a state within a state, which is the original ailment and the core legacy of the July state,” Tamer Wagih wrote in al-Masry al-Youm last week.

Yet, he saw an opportunity for action, very much different from calls for an August 24 protest against the MB – calls led by part of the camp that had previously declared it preference of military rule over the MB’s.

Wagih suggested taking advantage of Mursi’s success in removing military leaders to pressure him to achieve social, economic and political demands through a popular, grassroots movement. This popular movement, he explained, should reveal the deal that was struck, not between Mursi and Tantawi, but between the conservative and reformist MB and the wing of the “new liberal state” that is not as strongly aligned with the former regime.

Comments

Submitted by Rosana (not verified) on Thu, 2012-11-15 05:50.

"Only in Israel!!" I think you are right, only in Israel. This is relaly, relaly cool. The morale of these men and women seems extremely high. They are doing exactly what they signed on to do and want to do. That is to defend their homeland. If American troops could address the American people I wonder what they would say. In contrast to the Israeli forces, instead of defending America like most of these men and women signed up to do they are instead engaged in fruitless nation building efforts thousands of miles away. No wonder the morale of our warriors is low and getting lower. Our warriors need to be redeployed to positions on our borders and off our coasts where they have a fighting chance to deend our country and its people. To do any thing else is to do a disservice to them, to America, and to its people. These "fierce, young eagles" are the most important buffer between us and Islamic terrorist enemies whou would do us harm. If Islamic terrorist assets were not deployed against Israel, they'd be deployed elsewhere, probably much closer to America. Without Israel it would be much more costly and more difficult to defend America. The importance of the Israelis as a buffer between us and Islamic terrorists is only going to grow in coming years. From continuing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere the US military is now worn out and broken. Furthermore the commanding officers and the politicians who are in charge understand nothing of tactics or strategic thinking. In order to have a capable military, the US military will need to be rebuilt from the ground up on all levels, new officers will need to be trained, and we will may have to lean heavily on other nations who understand these things to help us in this regard. Building a military which include capable Naval, Air Force, and land equipment, training the officers, and getting them in the field, in the air, and on the water and combat ready takes significant time and money. America has neither of these commodities right now and is unlikely to at any time in the future. In its current state, the ability of the American military to carry out even basic dfesne of the American mainland is problematic at best.Given this dire state that America is in, the role of allies like Israel will become even more important in the future. I wonder if we can get any more allies like this? It will be exceedingly difficult. It will likely begin changing the narrative about America around the world. As long as we are almost universially despised, getting the assistance we badly need will be probelmatic at best and very likely impossible.