Assad Foreign Policy (I): A History of Consistence

Bullet casings are seen near sandbags in the center of Houla, near Homs 1 June 2012. (Photo: Reuters - Saria Al-Houlani - Handout)

By: Amal Saad-Ghorayeb

Published Tuesday, June 19, 2012

Chief among Third-Wayers’ denunciations against the Assad regime’s foreign policy record are accusations that relate to its alleged history of defeat, and later quietism, vis-à-vis Israel, as well as its persecution and cynical use of Lebanese and Palestine groups resisting the Zionist state. For these detractors, the Assad leadership’s anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist stances amount to little more than public posturing intended to preserve its popular legitimacy and is therefore of negligible strategic value to the resistance axis. While many of those making this argument are merely engaging in ex-post facto rationalization – that is, formulating retrospective explanations to justify their current position – this depiction of the Syrian regime as having “colluded” with imperialism in the past, warrants a comprehensive response, if only to underline the centrality of Assad’s Syria to the resistance project and the Palestinian cause generally.

Realism Versus Constructivism

The core problem with the Third Way historical meta-narrative is that it rests on political Realism, a school of thought which dominates the American tradition of the International Relations discipline. The Realist school views states as essentially self-interested actors, who pursue their security and the same predefined economic, political and military interests at the expense of ideological values and principles. While Realism is a useful theoretical tool for explaining some aspects of Syrian foreign policy, by no means does it account for it in its entirety, and even less so in the case of Bashar al-Assad’s regional policy. However, most Third Way intellectuals who study Syria adopt the Realist approach and consequently, reduce all Syrian foreign policy to power politics, while viewing the regime – a view which invariably conflates Hafez al-Assad’s with Bashar’s rule – as governed by considerations of crude realpolitik and regime/state interests, which it would readily sacrifice its ideological principles for.

A more discerning examination of Syrian foreign policy requires a paradigm shift from Realism to Constructivism. The latter approach is based on the ontological premise that reality isn’t only material but also ideational; both the social world and knowledge are socially constructed, and as such, “a state’s interests are not just out there waiting to be discovered,” but are shaped by identities which define political actors. These identities are constructed through foreign policy discourses which “shape the identity of the state, its ‘rationality’, the ‘reality’ it defines, and its interests and preferences in its interactions with the world.”

In short, interests are defined by identities and are hence, not predefined universal givens. Hafez al-Assad said as much in this excerpt from 1994 : “There has been much talk about interests in this historic stage of international development...We say that when we talk about interests we mean...not just economic interests, but...[national] sentiments and common culture and heritage.”

Syria’s Political Identity

Only by interrogating the Syrian state’s identity, can we make meaningful sense of what its foreign policy interests are and how it pursues them. As Hussein Agha and Ahmad S. Khalidi have observed in their book “Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Co-Operation”, published by Chatham House, both national identity and the definition of the “national interest” in Assad’s Syria, can best be described as “Syrio-centric Arabism”, that is, a confluence of pan-Arabism and Syrian nationalism.

In turn, this identity has been shaped by an irredentist and revisionist drive following western colonialism’s dismemberment of historic Syria, “Bilad al-Sham”, into 4 mini-states – Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestine. The usurpation of Palestine and creation of Israel in its place, added a staunch anti-Zionism to Syria’s pan-Arab, anti-imperialist identity, an identity which was only reinforced by the loss of the Golan in the 1967 war.

Beyond preserving its physical security, the Assad leadership’s mumanaa has also become a principal source of its ontological security. That is, security of its identity as a resistant state and champion of Arab rights. According to Constructivism, ontological security is a defining feature of all foreign policy; like humans, states are social actors which have both physical needs and social drives. Thus, in addition to the need for physical security, states also strive for a security of their identity. This characteristic of states is often lost on Third Wayers who oversimplify Syria’s national security policy as a pursuit of physical [regime] security, or its mere survival as an institutional entity, to the exclusion of the security of its identity or being as a particular kind of actor.

Anti-zionism and anti-imperialist Syrio-centric Arabism were the founding principles of the Assad regime. As depicted by the scholars Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch: “Hafez al-Assad’s seizure of power in 1970 aimed to unify [the] regime and country for the struggle to recover lost Arab territories from Israel; he designed his regime to carry on this struggle.” The ensuing military and economic costs wrought by the 1973 and 1982 wars with Israel (20,000 reported military casualties and military spending that reached over 50% of Syria’s GNP by the end of the 1980s) routinized the conflict as a stable fixture of the Syrian national identity.

But that is not to say that Syrian anti-Zionism is purely reactive and the result of the perception of Israel’s threat to Syria’s security. According to Agha and Khalidi: “Assad has never severed himself from his basic ideological roots. From this perspective the struggle with Israel, although undeniably aggravated by the occupation of Syrian soil on the Golan since 1967, is not to be seen as a purely territorial issue.... this hostility also has other elements, primary among them the Syrian commitment to the Palestinian cause. From a Baathist pan-Arab perspective, the creation of Israel is not only morally unjust and a trespass against the Palestinians but a transgression against the Arab people and the greater Arab homeland.”

It is for this reason that Syria has one of the strictest anti-normalization [with Israel] policies in the region, despite its participation in the so-called “peace negotiations”. As the Israeli professor Hillel Frisch observes in his discourse analysis of over 80 issues of the Syrian military journal Jaish al-Shaab: “The basic theme is that Zionism is incorrigibly evil, whether under a right-wing Likud government or under a Labor government. Implacable hatred of the ‘Zionist enemy’ continued to prevail, and even intensify, after the Madrid peace conference in 1991”. Frisch further corroborates the main thesis of this essay when he asserts that: “even realism cannot explain the persistence of the portrayal of demonic images of the enemy (as the above quotations demonstrate) long after these talks ensued. That would require recognition of the importance of ideology, as the idealists and constructivists argue.”

Not only is the Syrian army’s military doctrine a staunchly anti-Zionist one, but its media and public diplomacy are governed by a similar legitimacy-withholding ethos. As a matter of policy, Syrian officials do not meet with their Israeli counterparts, even in the context of peace negotiations, prompting former Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to complain that “Syria’s president has not done even one per cent of what President Sadat did to convince the people of Israel and in Syria that he wants peace.” Nor do they give interviews to Israeli media. A recent Times of Israel article compares the Syrian opposition’s openness to talking with Israeli media outlets with the Assad regime’s “taboo” of talking to Israeli journalists or even granting them visas to enter Syria. Moreover, Syrian censorship authorities ban all access to Israeli websites.

As decades of Syrian history have testified, the Assad regime’s identification of Arab and Palestinian rights with its national identity, also extends to its national security and foreign policy behavior. Ehteshami and Hinnebsch note that “The identification of Syrian interests with the Arab cause was no mere fiction and a purely Syrian-centred policy never took form: had it done so Asad could long ago have pursued a Sadat-like settlement with Israel over the Golan instead of mortgaging Syria’s welfare and future to a struggle chiefly in Arabist irredentism, not narrowly defined Syrian raison d’etat.”

Threats to Syria’s Physical Security

Such seemingly self-defeating behavior is typical of states pursuing ontological security. Although many of the policies chosen by them lead to outcomes which threaten their physical security, this remains secondary to the perceived stability of their self-identity. Thus, states can become “attached” to confrontational and dangerous routines as well as safe ones; ontological security is “perfectly compatible with physical insecurity”.

Therefore, despite the sustained campaign of pressure by the US on the Assad regime, the Syrian leadership has not succumbed to any of Washington’s demands – a resolve which has clearly cost the regime its physical security, as the current western-GCC-Israeli backed insurrection against Assad’s rule attests. Since 1979, Syria has been placed on the US State Department’s list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism” on account of its support for resistance movements in Palestine and Lebanon, and included in the Bush administration’s infamous “axis of evil” list in 2002, on that account as well.

Two months after the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell presented Assad with a list of demands that included cutting off support to resistance forces in Lebanon and Iraq, as well as closing down Hamas and Islamic Jihad operations in their Damascus base – policies, Powell claimed which “no longer have the same relevance” in “a changing Middle East”. The price for Syria’s refusal to capitulate to this ultimatum was the imposition of a harsh sanctions regime, known as the Syria Accountability and Lebanon Sovereignty Act which was approved by Congress and signed by President Bush in May 2004. As reported by Eyal Zisser, “the US sanctions damaged and even blocked Syrian efforts to integrate into the world economy”. The US then spearheaded UN Security Council Resolution 1559 which called for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon, and a year later, engineered the UN inquiry into the assassination of Lebanese Premier Rafik al-Hariri (UNIIIC) which – based on the flimsiest of evidence – accused the Syrian regime of the assassination.

Aside from these political and diplomatic pressures, Washington has overtly harbored regime-change designs for Syria as far back as 1996 when the “Clean Break” document was drafted by former Assistant Secretary for Defence, Richard Perle for Netahyahu who was running for Prime Minister at the time. The report advises:

“Israel can shape its strategic environment, in cooperation with Turkey and Jordan, by weakening, containing, and even rolling back Syria. This effort can focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq – an important Israeli strategic objective in its own right – as a means of foiling Syria’s regional ambitions.”

According to The Nation magazine, the Syria Accountability Act itself was a product of the Clean Break document. Further attesting to the US strategy of regime-change for Syria was General Wesley Clarke’s admission in a 2007 interview that he had been informed by a general in 2001 that the Pentagon was planning on “taking out 7 countries in 5 years starting with Iraq, then Syria and Lebanon. Then Libya, Somalia and Sudan. Then finishing off Iran.”

Amal Saad-Ghorayeb is a Lebanese academic and political analyst. She is author of the book, “Hizbullah: Politics and Religion”, and blogger at ASG’s Counter-Hegemony Unit.

The views expressed by the author do not necessarily reflect Al-Akhbar's editorial policy.

Comments

thereby indirectly fanning the flames of Sunni-Shia tension in Syria and the region at large.

STEAM IS BLOWING OUT MY EARS, MOUTH AND NOSTRILS! First, last and always, Judea and Samaria are Israeli proeprty. I don't give a flying fig WHAT Jordan enamed that land when the unlawfully occupied it, it is JEWISH LAND, ALWAYS HAS BEEN AND WITH ANY SENSE OF INTELLIGENCE it will remain so. But intelligence seems to be the one thing lacking in the Israeli leadership.WHERE is the "moral equivalence" in this outrageous situation? WHERE? It does not exist. All I have to say to the world is bah fongul. Would Washington permit an Arab state adjacen to its borders? We all know the answer to that one, don't we? The world is filled to overflowing with hypocricy and their sympathies lay with the Nazis and the Arabs who learned the BIG LIE technique from their grand mufti who spent most of WWII in Berlin hanging out with such nefarious characters as Eichman and others including the author of the big lie, Hitler himself.There are no such people as "Palestinians." Yet Israel kisses tush as though they had a legitimate "right" to their own state. Syrians are killing other Syrians because they are the "wrong kind" of Musims. It is as though Orthodox Jews went around killing Reformed Jews. They don't particulary like them, but that is a far cry from out-and-out slaughtering innocent people.How I wish that there was some way to stop Assad, but if you look at his name, it is self-descriptive: Ass and sad. It all has to do with GREED and POWER. It still boggls my little brain how one man can control millions of people and breed loyalty with their troops.Other Muslims don't give a damn about the suffering of their own people, why should they care about Syria? It is too bad that Israel can't do anything about the situation.Pardon me, I've got to toss my cookies right NOW.

This is seriously poor scholarship.
The whole argument is a straw man: no one says the Syrian regime uses the Palestinian cause for physical security only. In fact Syria lost the 1967 war with significant casualties. Instead, Syria uses the Palestianian cause to provide an ideological verisimilitude (we can all use big words) to its paucity of real beliefs. This regime exists for itself only. Palestine enables to it pretend otherwise.

The Western-Israeli-GCC Axis of Evil wants to reduce Syria to the same condition as every other place that is ruled by the Axis. Syria must privatize everything, beginning with its central bank and its oil ministry. Syria must eliminate free education and free health care. Syria must deregulate its financial sector. Syria must let foreign corporations come in and establish monopolies (MacDonalds, Wal Mart, Coca Cola, etc). Syria must have no food or fuel subsidies for the poor. The Syrian government must accept massive debt, with loan money going into the pockets of pro-Western elitists, and the debt dumped on the masses in the form of austerity. Syria must shut down all factories, and send the jobs to overseas sweatshops. Syria must worship and adore Israel. Syrian media sources must be owned by rich elitists (preferably Jews). Syria must join OPEC, so that the Axis of Evil may control Syria’s oil output. Syria must work to destroy Iran. And so on. In short, Syria must become like any globalized Western nation, with the 1% controlling all, and the 99% permanently enslaved. Then Syria will no longer be a “rogue nation.”

If the Axis-backed terrorists succeed in getting regime change, they will afterward be crushed. They will wish they had never destroyed Syria. They will be just like the Axis-backed terrorists in Libya.

Where were you when Hafez al-Assad was collaborating with the Americans in Gulf War I?

When Syrian shells rained down on the Tel Al-Zaatar refugee camp in Lebanon in one of the worst massacres of Palestinians or thousands of Palestinians were forced out of the Latakia refugee camp and dozens were killed, was Syria being consistent?

The Syrian regime uses the Palestinian cause even as it tortures and kills Palestinians, including anti-zionist leftists like Salameh Kaileh, it's the worst form of hypocrisy. Apologists for Assad are no different then Maoist during Mao's "great leap forward" who ignored the genocide of civilians for "ideological reasons." It's surprising how many people can look at a murderous tyrant like Bashar and his cult of followers who are paid to torture and murder dissidents and see in that the key to Palestinian freedom. You do not represent the views of the majority of Palestinians who oppose this disgusting regime!

This is another attempt to portray the Assad regime as the protector of Pan Arabism and the major bulwark against Zionism. Let us for the sake of the argument grant Ms. Saad-Ghorayeb that the above is true. This leads to the need to answer three questions: (1) Has the commitment and the advocacy of the Assad inspired foreign policy led to any tangible gains. This is a crucially important question since it can be argued that an ineffective advocate is not worthy of support. (2) Is the support of a "sacred" cause by any party irrespective of its character enough of a rationale to protect it and defend it. (3) Wouldn't it be preferable to lend support to a democratic regime that is committed to the Palestinian cause.

Unless we admit that our support for any idea is not tantamount to an unqualified willingness to accept the aid of cruel dictatorships that profess support for a concept that we hold in high esteem then our efforts to rationalize protection of such nefarious regimes is nothing else but apologetics

and another attempt by you to sound erudite and objective. You're neither.
When you said "let's grant her that what she said is true for the sake of the argument", was that an attempt to prove by contradiction the fallacy of what she put forth. Because if it is, I am still waiting for the part where you arrive at the contradiction rendering her argument false. Don't say things for the sake of saying them. Every time you write it's sounding more and more like you're the one who's building an argument around an opinion you always held.
As for your questions, here are the answers:
Question 1: Yes, it led to tangible gains. South Lebanon 2000, 2006. Palestine: 2008-2009. In both instances the zionist entity was reduced to nothing more than an army that can destroy infrastructure without any political gains.
Question 2: No. But you have to apply discretion.
Question 3: Yes. But you have to apply discretion. Ghalyoon declared that he will return the Golan Heights by negotiation. In other words he will liberate Syria in the same effective manner that Mahmoud Abbas, Salam Fayyad and Saeb Urekat negotiated for the liberation of Palestine. (for a guide on how effective they were, look up the Palestine Papers).

Neither are you and why didn't the "mumana'a" of the Palestinians in Lebanon in the 80's suffice after they fought the Zionists when Amal waged a war upon them? Isn't that what Amal and Hezbollah are demanding of the anti-regime Syrians with Bashar? Why does your sect make takfeer of Umar ibn al-Khattab and Salah ad-Deen al-Ayyubi after they liberated Palestine for the Arabs and Muslims? Why doesn't their "mumana'a" suffice for your ilk? This proves that the Palestinian cause is secondary to the maintaining power at all costs for both Bashar and Hezbollah.

"ex-post facto . . . meta-narrative . . . ontological . . . a paradigm shift from Realism to Constructivism" ... .. granted, these are very impressive words, but why are 80% of officers Alawi? hmmm?..... it's because the alawis want to rule the country. that's why!... here's how it works: the sunnis hate the jews (or are anti-zionist and anti-imperialist if you like to camouflage it with big words). so if the Alawis want to rule the country they at least have to match the sunni hate for the jews by words and by deeds!.... of course, this doesn't prove that the Alawis are faking it... not at all... in fact, i think the Alawis really hate the jews too... just as they hate the christians whose country they destroyed... just as they hate the sunnis in secret, whom in turn hate both.... look, it's the muslim culture, which is all about hating another group of people and finding ways to inflict harm and evil on it... that's all they do... so now, the sunnis don't want to be ruled by alawis anymore, and the Alawis are responding by killing the sunnis, so the sunnis want to curse the Alawis with the worst kind of accusation. and what would that be? it is that the alawis don't really hate the jews!!!... wow, what a despicable accusation!! but of course, the alawis do hate the jews... so the sunnis are saying that just as an insult ok?.... it's like calling somebody "a dog"... it is not meant literally.. but only as an insult... get it?

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