Iraq After the Withdrawal II: The Specter of Sects

The US-installed system of sectarian political representation is coming home to roost in Iraq. Secular parties and coalitions seem to be disintegrating while hawkish political posturing is becoming the norm.

Baghdad - One reason for the increasingly sectarian state of affairs in Iraq is the absence of any major national non-sectarian political force. Developments within the Iraqiya Bloc have made this absence more acute. That supposedly secular coalition has, by the admission of some of its former leaders, become a political and social clone of one of its component groups, the Tawafuq (Reconciliation) Front. As for the Iraqi Communist Party – one of the country’s oldest and historically most important secular parties – its current leadership has reduced it to little more than a sidekick and cheerleader for the Kurdish nationalist parties.

A second reason, according to some analysts, lies in the underpinnings of the political system based on sectarian apportionment. These include, above all, the current constitution. Even its defenders concede that it was drafted in abnormal circumstances and with much foreign meddling (including the active and dubious participation of various supposed foreign experts, of whom Peter Galbraith and Noah Feldman are the best known).

But the third and most important reason, in the view of many observers, is the fact that ‘hawks’ prevail in the leadership of virtually all the country’s political parties and forces, both within and outside the American-installed political process.

Thus it was the supposed secularist Ahmad Chalabi who set up the first overtly sectarian political organization, called the ‘Shii Political Home.’ His sectarianism is no less extreme than that of fellow former MP Adnan Dulaimi, renowned for his violent anti-Shia diatribes in Istanbul. Yet both men claim to be moderates who stand for some form of political secularism.

The prevalent political rhetoric speaks for itself. Sunni leaders demand the removal of the country’s “Iranian” or “Iranian-origin” rulers – or “Iranian stooges brought back on American tanks” – and want a new political system tailored to their sectarian whims to be built from scratch.

No less dangerous to Iraq are the extremists in Nouri al-Maliki’s Daawa Party or any of the other Shii Islamist parties, who employ the language of exclusion and demonization against all political opponents or dissenters. All are “criminal murderers” and “followers of al-Qaeda and the Saddamist Baath,” and there can be no dialogue with these “terrorists.”

There are people who can be described as ‘doves’ in both camps too. But their hesitance and reluctance to speak out, the lack of clarity in their programs, and their tendency to dramatically shift positions, has facilitated the ascendancy of the hawks.

Nouri al-Maliki is one example. He could have made history as the man who saved the country from the sectarian civil warfare which peaked in 2006-7. But he turned instead into a strongman, effectively wielding power on behalf of one sect.

Some days ago, Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq from the Iraqiya Bloc famously described Maliki as “the worst dictator in the history of Iraq” and accused him of “leading the country to civil war.” Such rhetoric may not be unusual in Iraq, or other countries that have just emerged from the darkness of dictatorship and foreign occupation. But it underlined the critical condition which the ruling sectarian coalition has reached. And while some thought it excessive, it reflected a real – and far from unjustified – sense of alarm on the Sunni side.

The surprising thing about Mutlaq’s outburst was not so much what he said, but that it was made by him. Mutlaq has never been known to harbor any sectarian prejudices or advocate sectarian or broadly Islamist policies, although in practice he is counted as a Sunni Arab leader. His case is not dissimilar to Maliki’s, despite their obviously different backgrounds. Mutlaq was once a Baathist, though he was expelled from the party in 1977, and was active as a businessman in the 1990s, producing grain during the embargo.

But Mutlaq’s public pronouncements gradually began to reflect his status as a member of the sect which forms the bulk of the constituency of his National Dialogue Front. Political developments on the ground, unfolding in accordance with the logic of a declared or undeclared state of sectarian conflict, forced a change in Mutlaq’s stance. The same could be said for the way Maliki abandoned the position he adopted after the ‘Charge of the Knights’ military operation in 2008.

The examples of Mutlaq and Maliki illustrate the scale of the threat posed by political sectarianism when its runs rampant, with no serious democratic and national forces to counter it. It stifles and shackles even those who do not believe in it, or are ideologically opposed to it.

But is Maliki truly leading Iraq to a civil war? Some analysts reply unhesitatingly in the affirmative, especially if Maliki retains the premiership – plus his team of advisers, most of whom are sectarian hawks – and maintains his authoritarian and exclusionary approach. They warn that if Maliki opts to form a narrow government, as he is tempted to do, that really would be a recipe for renewed civil war.

Yet the leading decision makers in the Iraqyia Bloc appear to have decided – at their late-night meeting at the home of Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi – to offer Maliki and his allies precisely such a ‘gift.’ By opting to suspend their participation in the political process, they make the formation of a narrow government a matter of necessity rather than choice for Maliki.

This would be a serious escalation, which could prompt the hawks in Iraqiya to consider violent options. There are fears that Iraq could be due a wave of bombings or assassinations soon.

It is almost inconceivable that these hawks could prevail in a civil war. But it would destroy the country, and result in sectarian and ethnic massacres and cleansing on a horrific scale. No sect, tribe or family would be spared.

Indeed, the Arab Sunnis as a sect would likely be the biggest losers if they are dragged behind the slogans of their hawks. The doves, and those with common sense, must do their utmost to avoid that.

This article is an edited translation from the Arabic Edition.